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1 Introduction
The relationship between ination and economic growth has been a fundamental question
in macroeconomics ever since the seminal work of Tobin (1965). Subsequent studies in this
literature tend to focus on how ination a¤ects economic growth via the accumulation of
physical capital and/or human capital.1 However, the seminal study by Solow (1956) shows
that economic growth is ultimately driven by technological progress, at least in the long run.
Therefore, to fully capture the e¤ects of ination on economic growth, it is important to
explore how ination a¤ects economic growth via endogenous technological progress. Studies
in this more recent branch of the literature2 however have mostly focused on a closed-economy
analysis. Given the importance of cross-country spillover e¤ects of R&D as shown by Coe
and Helpman (1995) and Coe at al. (2009) among others, this study analyzes how ination
a¤ects innovation and international technology transfer.
Specically, we explore the cross-country e¤ects of ination on innovation and interna-
tional technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) in a scale-invariant North-
South quality-ladder growth model that features innovative R&D in the North and adaptive
R&D in the South. Multinational rms invest in adaptive R&D in the South to transfer
the production of the highest quality products from the North to the South in order to take
advantage of the lower Southern wage rate. To model money demand, we impose cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraints on R&D investment, which is costly and subject to cash require-
ments in reality; see for example Chu et al. (2015) for a discussion of empirical evidence.3
We capture these cash requirements on R&D by imposing CIA constraints on innovative
R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. Within this monetary growth-theoretic
framework, we derive the following results.
Higher ination in the South causes a permanent decrease in the rate of international
technology transfer via the Southern CIA constraint on adaptive R&D. Higher ination in
the South also has the following general-equilibrium e¤ects: a permanent increase in the
North-South wage gap, and a temporary decrease in the rate of innovation in the North.
Intuitively, higher ination in the South raises the cost of adaptive R&D, which in turn
reduces the incentives for international technology transfer. As a result, less products are
manufactured by Southern rms and more products are produced by Northern rms. The
higher demand for production labor in the North reduces R&D labor, which in turn decreases
the rate of Northern innovation but only temporarily due to the semi-endogenous-growth
property of the model. Finally, given that higher ination in the South has a direct negative
e¤ect on the demand for Southern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the South relative
1See for example Stockman (1981), Abel (1985), Dotsey and Ireland (1996) and Gillman and Kejak (2005).
2See for example Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), Chu and Lai (2013) and Chu and Cozzi (2014).
3Early empirical studies, such as Hall (1992) and Opler et al. (1999), show a positive and signicant
relationship between R&D expenditures and cash ows in US rms. From 1980 to 2006, the average cash-to-
assets ratio in US rms increased substantially, and Bates et al. (2009) argue that this trend is partly driven
by the rmsincreasing R&D expenditures. Brown and Petersen (2011) show that rms smooth their R&D
expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves. Berentsen et al. (2012)
argue that information frictions and limited collateral value of R&D capital require rms to nance R&D
projects with cash. Falato and Sim (2014) use rm-level data in the US to show that rmscash holdings
increase (decrease) signicantly in response to a rise (cut) in R&D tax credits. These results suggest that
due to nancial frictions, rms need to use cash to nance their R&D investment.
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to the North.
Higher ination in the North causes a temporary decrease in the rate of Northern innova-
tion via the CIA constraint on innovative R&D in the North. Higher ination in the North
also has the following general-equilibrium e¤ects: a permanent decrease in the North-South
wage gap, and an ambiguous e¤ect on the rate of technology transfer from the North to
the South depending on the relative size of the two economies. Specically, we nd that if
the Southern population size is su¢ ciently large (small), then an increase in the ination
rate in the North would cause a permanent decrease (increase) in the rate of technology
transfer from the North to the South. Intuitively, higher ination in the North raises the
cost of innovative R&D, which in turn reduces the incentives for innovation. As a result,
the rate of innovation decreases temporarily. Given that higher ination in the North has a
direct negative e¤ect on the demand for Northern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in
the North relative to the South. As for the e¤ects on the rate of international technology
transfer, there are two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, it reduces the long-run level
of aggregate quality, which reduces the di¢ culty of adaptive R&D due to the property of
increasing R&D di¢ culty in the semi-endogenous growth model.4 This is a positive e¤ect
on international technology transfer. On the other hand, higher ination in the North also
reduces the incentives for adaptive R&D because there are less benets from FDI due to the
smaller North-South wage gap. This negative e¤ect on international technology transfer via
adaptive R&D labor in the South is relatively strong when the Southern labor force is large.
Therefore, the overall e¤ect of higher ination in the North on technology transfer would be
negative (positive) if the Southern population size is su¢ ciently large (small).
We calibrate the model to China-US data in order to conduct a quantitative investigation
on the cross-country e¤ects of ination via the CIA constraints. We nd that permanently
decreasing ination to achieve the Friedman rule (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate) in the
US would raise the wage gap between the US and China by 0.18% (percent change) and
surprisingly decrease the ow of technology transfer from the US to China by 1.06% (percent
change). Decreasing ination in the US also leads to welfare gains that are equivalent to a
permanent increase in consumption of 4.93% in the US and 5.02% in China. These signicant
welfare gains are due to a large increase in the level of technology by 4.09%. Therefore, the
cross-country welfare e¤ect of ination is quantitatively signicant from the North to the
South.
On the other hand, permanently decreasing ination to achieve the Friedman rule in
China would reduce the wage gap between the US and China by 0.20% and increase the
ow of technology transfer from the US to China by 1.21%. Also, it leads to relatively small
welfare gains of 0.41% in China and 0.43% in the US. These small welfare gains are partly
due to the small increase in the level of technology by 0.39%. In other words, reducing
ination in China leads to a much smaller increase in the level of technology than reducing
ination in the US. This nding is due to innovation originating from the North.5
In the literature on ination and economic growth, Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985)
analyze a CIA constraint on capital investment in a monetary version of the Neoclassical
4See Venturini (2012) for empirical evidence based on US manufacturing industry data that supports the
semi-endogenous growth model with increasing R&D di¢ culty.
5According to the OECD, at the beginning of this century OECD countries performed over 90% of global
R&D. Although this share is gradually declining, it remains over 70% in 2014.
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growth model. Subsequent studies in this literature explore the e¤ects of ination on capital
accumulation in variants of the capital-based growth model. For example, Dotsey and Ireland
(1996) explore the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination in an AK-type growth model.
Studies in this literature usually nd a negative e¤ect of ination on economic growth; see
for example Gillman and Kejak (2005) for a survey. The presence of a negative growth e¤ect
of ination is supported by many empirical studies; see Barro (1996) for an early study and
Baharumshah et al. (2016) for a recent survey.
This study associates more closely with the related literature on ination and innovation-
driven growth. In this literature, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) provide the seminal study that
analyzes the e¤ects of ination via a CIA constraint on consumption in a variant of the
variety-expanding model in Romer (1990).6 In contrast, we explore the e¤ects of ination
in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model as in Chu and Lai (2013), Chu and Cozzi (2014),
He and Zou (2016), Chu et al. (2017), Huang et al. (2017), Iwaisako and Ohki (2017) and
Neto et al. (2017).7 However, the present study di¤ers from all these closed-economy studies
by considering an open-economy two-country model, which enables us to explore the cross-
country e¤ects of the CIA constraints on innovation and international technology transfer. In
this open-economy model, we nd that ination in a country could lead to a sizable welfare
e¤ect in another country, which is an important nding that cannot be obtained in a closed-
economy analysis. Chu et al. (2015) also analyze the e¤ects of ination in an open-economy
Schumpeterian model, but they consider an environment with two Northern economies; in
other words, the model in Chu et al. (2015) does not feature North-South product cycles
and international technology transfer via FDI, which are important characteristics of the
interaction between developed and developing economies. To our knowledge, this is the rst
study that explores the e¤ects of ination in the presence of North-South product cycles and
international technology transfer via FDI. This novel monetary growth-theoretic framework
enables us to discover some interesting e¤ects of the CIA constraints on innovation and
international technology transfer and to take the model to data for a quantitative analysis
of the e¤ects of ination across developed and developing countries.
Our study also relates to a search-theoretic study of money and innovation by Berentsen
et al. (2012), who consider a search-and-matching process in the innovation sector and intro-
duce a channel through which ination a¤ects innovation activities. This paper complements
the interesting work of Berentsen et al. (2012) in the following ways. First, Berentsen et al.
(2012) assume a simple innovation process in the form of knowledge capital accumulation
that neither features creative destruction nor business-stealing e¤ects that are important
elements of the Schumpeterian growth theory. Second, although the search-and-matching
framework in Berentsen et al. (2012) provides a useful and elegant microfoundation for the
CIA constraint on R&D in a closed economy, our reduced-form modelling of CIA constraints
allows us to provide a tractable analysis of the interaction between the two CIA constraints
on R&D and FDI across countries.
Finally, our study relates to the literature on the determinants of FDI. In this literature,
6See also Arawatari et al. (2016) and Hori (2017). Chu, Lai and Liao (2012) and Wan and Zhang (2016)
provide an analysis of ination in hybrid growth models in which economic growth is driven by both variety
expansion and capital accumulation even in the long run.
7See also Chu and Ji (2016) and Huang et al. (2015), who analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy in a
Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure.
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studies explore the potential determinants of FDI from a large number of variables; see
for example Eaton and Tamura (1994), Carr et al. (2001), Bergstrand and Egger (2007),
Head and Ries (2008) and Blonigen and Piger (2014). In this literature, some empirical
studies, such as Ahn et al. (1998), Cevis and Camurdan (2007), Demirhan and Masca
(2008), Azam (2010) and Ebiringa and Emeh (2013), nd that an increase in ination in
developing countries has a negative e¤ect on their inows of FDI. Our monetary North-South
quality-ladder model provides a theoretical explanation for this empirical negative e¤ect of
ination on FDI in developing countries.
2 A North-South monetary Schumpeterian model
The North-South quality-ladder growth model is based on Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010).
The North-South R&D-based growth model originates from the seminal study by Grossman
and Helpman (1991).8 The model in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) is a recent vintage
of this class of models and has the advantage of being free of scale e¤ects by featuring
semi-endogenous growth.9 In the Dinopoulos-Segerstrom model, multinational rms employ
Northern R&D labor to invest in innovative R&D that improves the quality of products
manufactured in the North. In order to take advantage of the lower production cost in the
South, the multinational rms then employ Southern R&D labor to invest in adaptive R&D
that transfers the production of the highest quality products from the North to the South.
After the manufacturing process of a product is transferred to the South, the multinational
rm faces the possibility of the product being imitated by domestic rms in the South.
To facilitate a realistic calibration to data, we generalize the Dinopoulos-Segerstrom
model by introducing several parameters. For example, we introduce various R&D external-
ities that are commonly discussed in the literature. Furthermore, we allow for asymmetric
labor productivity between the two countries. To introduce money demand, we incorporate
CIA constraints on innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. Then,
we analyze the e¤ects of ination in the two countries on innovation and international tech-
nology transfer. The Dinopoulos-Segerstrom model features exogenous imitation; therefore,
ination does not a¤ect imitation.10
8Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) provide a review of the subsequent development in this literature
that focuses on the e¤ects of intellectual property rights. See also Iwaisako et al. (2011) and Tanaka and
Iwaisako (2014) for recent contributions.
9See Jones (1999) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models. The semi-endogenous-
growth version of the quality-ladder model originates from Segerstrom (1998) and Li (2003).
10This study focuses on exogenous imitation for the following reasons. First, to allow for endogenous
imitation, the Dinopoulos-Segerstrom model would no longer be analytically tractable; see for example
Jakobsson and Segerstrom (2017). Second, allowing for endogenous imitation, we would need to assume that
imitated products generate monopolistic prots instead of featuring the more realistic competitive pricing for
imitated products. Finally, there is empirical evidence supporting a negative relationship between ination
and innovation activities; see for example Chu et al. (2015). However, we are not aware of any empirical
evidence for any relationship between ination and imitation activities.
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2.1 Household
In each country, there is a representative household. The lifetime utility function of the
household in the North is given by
UN =
Z 1
0
e ( gL)t ln cNt dt, (1)
where cNt denotes per capita consumption in the North at time t, and the parameter  >
0 determines subjective discounting. The population size, which is also the size of the
representative household, in the North is LNt , which increases at an exogenous population
growth rate gL > 0. To ensure that lifetime utility is bounded, we impose the following
parameter restriction:  > gL. For simplicity, we make a common assumption that f; gLg
are the same in the two countries. Total population in the world is Lt = LNt + L
S
t . We
use s  LSt =Lt to denote the share of world population in the South and 1  s  LNt =Lt to
denote the share of world population in the North.
The household in the North maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation
equation:
_ANt + _M
N
t = (i
N
t   gL)ANt   gLMNt + iNt BNt +WNt +DNt + TNt   PNt cNt .
PNt is the price of consumption goods denominated in units of domestic currency in the North.
ANt is the nominal value of nancial assets owned by each member of the household, and i
N
t
is the nominal interest rate in the North. MNt is the nominal value of domestic currency held
by each member of the household. BNt is the nominal value of domestic currency borrowed
by R&D entrepreneurs to nance their R&D investment in the North, and the rate of return
on BNt is the domestic nominal interest rate i
N
t .
11 There is a constraint on how much money
that each person can lend to R&D entrepreneurs, and the constraint is BNt  MNt .12 Each
member of the household supplies one unit of labor to earn a nominal wage WNt . D
N
t is the
nominal value of a prot from the R&D sector.13 TNt is the nominal value of a lump-sum
transfer (or tax if TNt < 0) from the government to each person in the North.
For convenience, we reexpress the asset-accumulation equation in real terms (denomi-
nated in units of consumption goods).
_aNt + _m
N
t = (r
N
t   gL)aNt  
 
Nt + gL

mNt + i
N
t b
N
t + w
N
t + d
N
t + 
N
t   cNt . (2)
aNt is the real value of nancial assets per capita, and r
N
t = i
N
t   Nt is the real interest rate
in the North. Nt is the ination rate of P
N
t in the North. m
N
t is the real value of domestic
11It can be easily shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on BNt must be equal to
iNt . The intuition can be explained as follows. The opportunity cost for the household to hold cash is the
nominal interest rate. Therefore, in order for the household to be willing to lend cash to rms, it must be the
case that rms pay the nominal interest rate in return. If rms pay less than the nominal interest rate, the
household would not lend any cash to rms. If they pay more than the nominal interest rate, the household
would want to lend an innite amount of cash to rms.
12In the case of an additional CIA requirement on consumption, the CIA constraint in the North becomes
PNt c
N
t + B
N
t  MNt . Given that we focus on inelastic labor supply for tractability, the CIA constraint on
consumption would have no e¤ect on the equilibrium allocations, except for the real money balance.
13See Section 2.4 for a discussion.
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currency per capita. bNt is the real value of domestic currency borrowed by domestic R&D
entrepreneurs, and the constraint becomes bNt  mNt . wNt is the real wage rate. dNt is the
real value of R&D prot. Nt is the real value of the lump-sum transfer from the government.
We follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to assume that there is a global nancial
market. In this case, the real interest rates in the two countries must be equal such that
rNt = r
S
t = rt.
14 From standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is15
_cNt
cNt
=
_cSt
cSt
= rt   , (3)
which implies that the growth rate of consumption is the same across countries.
2.2 Consumption goods
Consumption goods are produced by perfectly competitive rms that aggregate a unit con-
tinuum of intermediate goods Yt(j) using the following CES aggregator:
Ct =
Z 1
0
[Yt(j)]
 1
 dj
 
 1
, (4)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The resource
constraint on Ct is
Ct = c
N
t L
N
t + c
S
t L
S
t =

cNt (1  s) + cSt s

Lt, (5)
where cNt L
N
t is total consumption in the North and c
S
t L
S
t is total consumption in the South.
PNt is the price of consumption goods denominated in units of currency in the North. P
S
t is
the price of consumption goods denominated in units of currency in the South. Given zero
transportation cost, the law of one price holds such that PNt = tP
S
t , where t is the nominal
exchange rate. For convenience, we will express all variables in real terms denominated in
units of consumption goods that have the same value in the two countries. From prot
maximization, we derive the conditional demand function for Yt(j) as
Yt(j) = pt(j)
 Ct (6)
for j 2 [0; 1]. pt(j) is the price of Yt(j).
14The nominal interest rates in the two countries would be di¤erent if ination rates di¤er across countries.
However, even when the nominal interest rates di¤er across countries, there is no incentive for the household
to hold foreign currency. The reason is that given the same real interest rate across countries as a result of
the global nancial market, di¤erences in the nominal interest rates are due to di¤erences in the ination
rates, which in turn equal percent changes in the nominal exchange rate because the law of one price holds
in our model as we discuss below. Therefore, a small transaction cost on foreign exchange would discourage
the household from holding foreign currency.
15The representative household in the South also performs an analogous dynamic optimization.
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2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods j 2 [0; 1]. Some of these
intermediate goods are produced in the North, and each of these Northern industries is
temporarily dominated by a quality leader until the arrival of the next innovation.16 The
production function of intermediate goods manufactured by a quality leader in the North is
Yt(j) = z
nt(j)LNy;t(j)  Y Nt (j), (7)
where the parameter z > 1 is the step size of a quality improvement, and nt(j) is the
number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t. The rm
employs LNy;t(j) units of labor in the North for production. Given z
nt(j), the marginal cost of
production for the industry leader is wNt =z
nt(j). We follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010)
to assume that new quality leaders are always able to charge the unconstrained monopolistic
price because the closest competitors choose to immediately exit the market in equilibrium.17
In this case, the monopolistic price charged by industry leaders is
pt(j) =

   1
wNt
znt(j)
 pNt (j). (8)
To take advantage of the lower labor cost in the South, industry leaders in the North
invest in adaptive R&D in the South in order to shift the manufacturing process to the South.
If the adaptive R&D project of a Northern leader is successful, then a Southern a¢ liate of
the Northern leader would start producing the intermediate goods. The production function
of intermediate goods manufactured by the foreign a¢ liate of a Northern quality leader is
Yt(j) = z
nt(j)LFy;t(j)  Y Ft (j), (9)
where we have introduced  > 0 as a labor-productivity parameter, which captures the
productivity of Southern labor relative to Northern labor. The Southern a¢ liate employs
LFy;t(j) units of labor in the South for production, and the marginal cost of production
is wSt =[z
nt(j)], which is assumed to be less than wNt =z
nt(j). Given the marginal cost of
production, the unconstrained monopolistic price is
pt(j) =

   1
wSt
znt(j)
 pFt (j). (10)
The Southern a¢ liate produces the intermediate goods until the arrival of the next innovation
in the North or until the current innovation is imitated by other rms in the South. When
the next innovation arrives, the manufacturing process shifts back to the North. To ensure
that this return of production to the North occurs, we follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(2010) to assume wSt = > w
N
t =z, so that new quality leaders are able to drive out Southern
a¢ liates of previous quality leaders.
Technologies of Southern a¢ liates may be imitated by other Southern rms subject to
an exogenous imitation rate . When this imitation occurs, the intermediate goods are
16This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature; see Cozzi (2007a) for a discussion.
17See Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) for a detailed discussion.
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produced by competitive rms in the South. The production function of intermediate goods
produced by competitive rms in the South is
Yt(j) = z
nt(j)LSy;t(j)  Y St (j), (11)
and the perfectly competitive price is given by the marginal cost of production:
pt(j) =
wSt
znt(j)
 pSt (j). (12)
Southern competitive rms produce the intermediate goods until the next innovation arrives
at which point the manufacturing process shifts back to the North.
Lets dene the aggregate quality index across industries j 2 [0; 1] as
Qt 
Z 1
0
qt(j)dj,
where qt(j) 

znt(j)
 1
. Then, we can derive the labor demands for an average-quality
product produced by a Northern leader as
~LNy;t = Qt


   1w
N
t
 
Ct, (13)
by a Southern a¢ liate as
~LFy;t = 
 1Qt


   1w
S
t
 
Ct, (14)
and by Southern competitive rms as
~LSy;t = 
 1Qt
 
wSt
 
Ct. (15)
Using these expressions, we can then express the labor demand for product j as
Loy;t(j) =
qt(j)
Qt
~Loy;t; (16)
where o = fN;F; Sg. The amount of monopolistic prot earned by a Northern leader is
Nt (j) =
wNt
   1
qt(j)
Qt
~LNy;t, (17)
and the amount of monopolistic prot earned by a Southern a¢ liate is
Ft (j) =
wSt
   1
qt(j)
Qt
~LFy;t. (18)
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2.4 Innovative and adaptive R&D
Innovative R&D is performed by entrepreneurs in the North. If an R&D entrepreneur em-
ploys Northern labor LNr;t(j) to engage in innovative R&D in industry j, then she is successful
in inventing the next higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous probabil-
ity given by18
'Nt (j) =
Qt

"
LNr;t
Qt
#N "
LNr;t(j)
qt(j)
#1 N
, (19)
where the parameter  > 0 inversely measures innovation productivity. qt(j) captures the
e¤ect of increasing innovation di¢ culty, which removes the scale e¤ect in the innovation
process of the quality-ladder model as in Segerstrom (1998).19 Here we introduce a positive
R&D spillover e¤ect,20 and the parameter N 2 [0; 1) measures the degree of this intratem-
poral R&D externality.21 We also consider an intertemporal knowledge spillover, and the
parameter  2 [0; 1) measures the degree of this externality. The expected benet from
investing in innovative R&D is vNt (j)'
N
t (j)dt, where v
N
t (j) is the real value of the expected
discounted prots generated by an innovation and 'Nt (j)dt is the entrepreneurs probability
of having a successful innovation during the innitesimal time interval dt. To facilitate the
wage payment to R&D labor in the North, the entrepreneurs borrow domestic currency22
from the domestic household.23 The cost of borrowing is determined by the nominal interest
rate iNt in the North. To parameterize the strength of the CIA constraint, we assume that
a fraction N 2 [0; 1] of R&D investment requires the borrowing of money from households
such that the amount of borrowing is NwNt L
N
r;t(j) in the North. Therefore, the total cost of
innovative R&D is (1 + N iNt )w
N
t L
N
r;t(j)dt. The prot-maximizing condition of R&D is
(1  N)'Nt (j)vNt (j) = (1 + N iNt )wNt LNr;t(j). (20)
Given (20), the amount of R&D prot in the North is24
18It is useful to note that although our R&D specication features decreasing returns to scale in individual
R&D labor LNr;t(j), it features constant returns to scale in aggregate R&D labor L
N
r;t in equilibrium.
19Section 6 explores the robustness of our results under an alternative R&D specication.
20See for example Ja¤e (1986), Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1989) and Los and Verspagen (2000) for
empirical evidence on the presence of R&D spillovers across rms.
21In (19), the scaling by Qt in (LNr;t=Qt)
N is to ensure a steady-state value of 'Nt (j).
22Given that this is wage payment to workers in the domestic economy, the wage payment is naturally paid
in domestic currency. Furthermore, there is no incentive for the entrepreneurs to borrow foreign currency
and convert it into domestic currency even when the nominal interest rates di¤er across countries because
uncovered interest rate parity holds in our model.
23Due to the static nature of the R&D sector in the model, we cannot consider the case in which R&D
entrepreneurs accumulate cash holdings. However, even if we allow entrepreneurs to accumulate cash, ina-
tion would have the same positive e¤ect on the cost of R&D as in our current setting in which entrepreneurs
borrow cash from the household because the opportunity cost of using cash to nance R&D is determined
by the nominal interest rate in both cases.
24Positive prot in the R&D sector can be justied by the presence of a xed factor input KN (j), which
is implicitly normalized to unity. For example, this xed factor input may be the entrepreneurial talent of
R&D entrepreneurs in the specic industry. Given that not everyone possesses this entrepreneurial talent,
there is no free entry in this industry generating a monopolistic rent that is captured by the entrepreneurs.
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dNt (j) = 
N'Nt (j)v
N
t (j).
Adaptive R&D in the South is performed by local entrepreneurs and the Southern a¢ li-
ates of Northern industry leaders. If the Southern a¢ liate of a Northern leader in industry
j employs Southern labor LFr;t(j) to engage in adaptive R&D, then the Northern rm is suc-
cessful in shifting the production to the Southern a¢ liate with an instantaneous probability
given by
'Ft (j) =
Qt

"
LFr;t
QNt
#F "
LFr;t(j)
qt(j)
#1 F
, (21)
where the parameter  > 0 inversely measures adaptation productivity. qt(j) captures the
e¤ect of increasing adaptation di¢ culty, and it removes the scale e¤ect in the adaptation
process as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010). Here we introduce a positive spillover e¤ect
of adaptive R&D, and the parameter F 2 [0; 1) measures the degree of this R&D external-
ity.25 We also consider intertemporal knowledge spillovers measured by . The expected net
benet for the Northern leader to invest in adaptive R&D is

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

'Ft (j)dt, where
vFt (j) is the real value of the expected discounted prots generated by the Southern a¢ liate
and 'Ft (j)dt is the probability of having a successful adaptation during the innitesimal
time interval dt. To facilitate the wage payment to R&D labor in the South, the Southern
a¢ liate borrows domestic currency from the domestic household, and the cost of borrowing
is determined by the nominal interest rate iSt in the South. To parameterize the strength of
the CIA constraint, we assume that a fraction S 2 [0; 1] of R&D investment requires the
borrowing of money from households such that the amount of borrowing is SwSt L
S
r;t(j) in
the South. Therefore, the total cost of adaptive R&D is (1 + SiSt )w
S
t L
F
r;t(j)dt. Given that
the net benet of adaptive R&D is increasing in LFr;t(j), the Southern a¢ liate engages in a
positive nite amount of adaptive R&D if and only if the following equilibrium condition
holds:
(1  F )'Ft (j)[vFt (j)  vNt (j)] = (1 + SiSt )wSt LFr;t(j). (22)
Given (22), the amount of R&D prot in the South is26
dFt (j) = 
F'Ft (j)

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

. (23)
Finally, Southern a¢ liates face the risk of imitation (with an exogenous probability  > 0)
by other rms in the South.
2.5 Stock market
The no-arbitrage condition that determines the value of vNt (j) is given by
27
rt =
Nt (j)  (1 + SiSt )wSt LFr;t(j)  dFt (j) + _vNt (j)  'Nt (j)vNt (j) + 'Ft (j)

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

vNt (j)
.
25In (21), the scaling by QNt (to be dened in Section 3.1) in (L
F
r;t=Q
N
t )
F ensures a steady-state 'Ft (j).
26Once again, positive prot is the rent captured by local entrepreneurs who own a xed factor input
KS(j), which is normalized to unity.
27It is useful to note that the following Nt (j) refers to the prot after the arrival of the next innovation.
11
This condition equates the real interest rate rt to the asset return per unit of asset. The
asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prots net of adaptive R&D expenditure and
rent,28 (b) any potential capital gain _vNt (j), (c) the expected capital loss  'Nt (j)vNt (j) from
creative destruction, and (d) the expected change in asset value 'Ft (j)

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

when
adaptive R&D is successful. Using (22) and (23), we simplify the no-arbitrage condition to
a more familiar expression given by
rt =
Nt (j) + _v
N
t (j)  'Nt (j)vNt (j)
vNt (j)
. (24)
The no-arbitrage condition that determines the value of vFt (j) is given by
rt =
Ft (j) + _v
F
t (j)  ['Nt (j) + ]vFt (j)
vFt (j)
. (25)
This condition equates the real interest rate rt to the asset return per unit of asset. The
asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prots in the South, (b) any potential capital
gain _vFt (j), (c) the expected capital loss  'Nt (j)vFt (j) from creative destruction, and (d) the
expected capital loss  vFt (j) from imitation.
The value of a successful innovation vNt (j) in industry j is linearly increasing in 
N
t (j),
which in turn is linearly increasing in qt(j) as shown in (17). Together with LNr;t(j) being
linearly increasing in qt(j), the arrival rate of innovation 'Nt (j) is independent of qt(j).
Therefore, we follow the standard treatment in this class of models to focus on the symmetric
equilibrium in which 'Nt (j) = '
N
t .
29 Similarly, the property that vFt (j) and L
F
r;t(j) are linearly
increasing in qt(j) implies that 'Ft (j) is independent of qt(j). Therefore, we focus on the
symmetric equilibrium in which 'Ft (j) = '
F
t .
2.6 Monetary authority
The monetary policy instrument in the North (South) is the domestic ination rate Nt (
S
t ),
which is exogenously chosen by the Northern (Southern) monetary authority. Given Nt
(St ), the nominal interest rate in the North (South) is endogenously determined according
to the Fisher identity iNt = 
N
t + rt (i
S
t = 
S
t + rt), where rt is the global real interest
rate. Then, the growth rate of the nominal money supply per capita in the North (South)
is endogenously determined by _MNt =M
N
t = 
N
t + _m
N
t =m
N
t ( _M
S
t =M
S
t = 
S
t + _m
S
t =m
S
t ). The
Northern (Southern) monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue as a lump-sum
transfer that has a real value of Nt = ( _M
N
t + gLM
N
t )=P
N
t (
S
t = ( _M
S
t + gLM
S
t )=P
S
t ) to each
member of the domestic household in the North (South).
It can be shown that due to the semi-endogenous-growth property of the model, the long-
run growth rate of total consumption Ct is given by gL [1 + (1  ) (   1)] = [(1  ) (   1)].
Therefore, from the Euler equation (3), the real interest rate in the steady state is given by
28Recall that R&D rent is not captured by Northern leaders or their Southern a¢ liates.
29See Cozzi (2007b) for a discussion on the possibility of multiple equilibria in the Schumpeterian growth
model. Cozzi et al. (2007) provide theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique
rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model.
12
r =  + gL= [(1  ) (   1)]. Consequently, there is an one-to-one relationship between
the nominal interest rate and the ination rate in the long run such that iN = N +  +
gL= [(1  ) (   1)] and iS = S + + gL= [(1  ) (   1)].30
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fcNt ; cSt ; Ct; Y Nt (j); Y Ft (j); Y St (j); LNy:t(j); LFy:t(j);
LSy:t(j); L
N
r:t(j); L
F
r:t(j)g1t=0, a time path of prices fwNt ; wSt ; pNt (j); pFt (j); pSt (j); vNt ; vFt ; tg1t=0
and a time path of monetary policies fiNt ; iSt g1t=0. Also, at each instance of time,
 the representative household in the North maximizes lifetime utility taking frt; iNt ; wNt g
as given;
 the representative household in the South maximizes lifetime utility taking frt; iSt ; wSt g
as given;
 competitive consumption-good rms produceCt to maximize prot taking fpNt (j); pFt (j);
pSt (j)g as given;
 quality leaders in the North choose pNt (j) and produce Y Nt (j) to maximize prot taking
wNt as given;
 a¢ liates in the South choose pFt (j) and produce Y Ft (j) to maximize prot taking wSt
as given;
 competitive intermediate goods rms produce Y St (j) to maximize prot taking fpSt (j); wSt g
as given;
 R&D entrepreneurs in the North employ LNr:t(j) to do innovative R&D taking fiNt ; wNt ; vNt g
as given;
 quality leaders in the North and their a¢ liates in the South employ LFr:t(j) to do
adaptive R&D taking fiSt ; wSt ; vFt g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for consumption goods holds;
 the market-clearing conditions for labor hold in both countries; and
 nally, the nominal exchange rate is determined by the law of one price such that
t = P
N
t =P
S
t .
30Empirical evidence supports a positive long-run relationship between ination and the nominal interest
rate; see for example Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001).
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3 Steady-state equilibrium
In this section, we proceed to solve the steady-state equilibrium in the following steps. First,
we derive the steady-state number of each type of industries and the steady-state expression
of the quality index. Then, we derive the steady-state labor market conditions in the two
countries. Finally, we put all these conditions together to derive the steady-state equilibrium
rates of technology transfer and innovation.
3.1 Industry composition and quality dynamics
In the intermediate goods sector, there are three types of industries in which intermedi-
ate goods are produced respectively by Northern quality leaders, Southern a¢ liates, and
Southern competitive rms. We use fN ; F ; Sg to denote the steady-state measure of these
three types of industries. To solve for these three endogenous variables, we use the following
conditions. First, the measure of all industries adds up to one.
N + F + S = 1. (26)
In the steady state, the ows in and out of each type of industry must be equal. The ow
into industries S dominated by Southern competitive rms is F given by the measure of
industries in which Southern a¢ liatestechnologies are imitated. The ow out of industries
S dominated by Southern competitive rms is S'N given by the measure of these com-
petitive industries experiencing the arrival of new innovations in the North. Therefore, the
second condition is
F = S'N . (27)
The ow into industries F dominated by Southern a¢ liates is N'F given by the measure
of industries in the North experiencing successful R&D adaptation. The ow out of industries
F dominated by Southern a¢ liates is the sum of (a) F'N given by the measure of these
industries experiencing the arrival of new innovations in the North and (b) F given by the
measure of industries in which Southern a¢ liatestechnologies are imitated. Therefore, the
third condition is
N'F = F ('N + ). (28)
Solving (26), (27) and (28) yields
N =
'N
'N + 'F
, (29)
F =
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
, (30)
S =

'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
. (31)
The aggregate quality index across industries j 2 [0; 1] is
Qt 
Z 1
0
qt(j)dj =
Z 1
0
nt(j)dj, (32)
14
where   z 1 is a composite parameter that is increasing in the quality step size z. This
quality index can be decomposed into the following three components:
Qt = Q
N
t +Q
F
t +Q
S
t =
Z
N
qt(j)dj +
Z
F
qt(j)dj +
Z
S
qt(j)dj. (33)
Lemma 1 provides the steady-state expression for the share of each of these three components
of aggregate quality.
Lemma 1 In the steady state, the three components of aggregate quality can be expressed as
QNt
Qt
=
'N
'N + 'F
, (34)
QFt
Qt
=
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
. (35)
QSt
Qt
=

'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
. (36)
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.2 Northern labor market
The market-clearing condition for labor in the North is given by
LNt = L
N
y;t + L
N
r;t =
Z
Nt
LNy;t(j)dj +
Z 1
0
LNr;t(j)dj. (37)
The amount of labor employed for production by Northern quality leaders is
LNy;t =
Z
Nt
qt(j)
Qt
~LNy;tdj =
QNt
Qt
~LNy;t, (38)
where the rst equality uses (16). The amount of labor employed for innovative R&D is
LNr;t = '
N
t Q
1 
t , (39)
which uses (19) and the symmetry condition 'Nt (j) = '
N
t . We dene x
N
t as the average
quality per Northern worker such that
xNt 
Q1 t
LNt
.
Finally, substituting (34), (38) and (39) into (37) yields the steady-state Northern labor-
market condition expressed in per-capita terms given by
1 =
'N
'N + 'F
~LNy;t
Lt
1
1  s + '
NxN , (40)
where we also have used LNt = (1  s)Lt.
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3.3 Southern labor market
The market-clearing condition for labor in the South is given by
LSt = L
S
y;t + L
F
y;t + L
F
r;t =
Z
St
LSy;t(j)dj +
Z
Ft
LFy;t(j)dj +
Z
Nt
LFr;t(j)dj. (41)
The amount of labor employed for production by Southern competitive rms is
LSy;t =
Z
St
qt(j)
Qt
~LSy;tdj =
QSt
Qt
~LSy;t, (42)
where the rst equality uses (16). The amount of labor employed for production by Southern
a¢ liates is
LFy;t =
Z
Ft
qt(j)
Qt
~LFy;tdj =
QFt
Qt
~LFy;t, (43)
where the rst equality also uses (16). The amount of labor employed for adaptive R&D by
Southern a¢ liates is
LFr;t = '
F
t
QNt
Qt
= 'Ft
QNt
Qt
Q1 t , (44)
where the rst equality uses (21) and the symmetry condition 'Ft (j) = '
F
t . Substituting
(34)-(36) and (42)-(44) into (41) yields the steady-state Southern labor market condition
expressed in per-capita terms given by
1 =
'F
'N + 'F
 

'N + 
~LSy;t
LSt
+
'N
'N + 
~LFy;t
LSt
+ 'N
Q1 t
LSt
!
, (45)
where Q1 t =L
S
t = x
NLNt =L
S
t = x
N(1  s)=s and

'N + 
~LSy;t
LSt
+
'N
'N + 
~LFy;t
LSt
=


'N + 


   1

+
'N
'N + 

| {z }
()
~LFy;t
Lt
1
s
,
which uses (14), (15) and LSt = sLt. It is useful to note that () is increasing in .
3.4 Innovation and technology transfer
We rst derive the growth rate of the quality index. Di¤erentiating (32) with respect to time
yields
_Qt =
Z 1
0
h
nt(j)+1   nt(j)
i
'Nt dj = (  1)'Nt Qt. (46)
Then, taking the log of xNt = Q
1 
t =L
N
t and di¤erentiating with respect to time yields
_xNt
xNt
= (1  )
_Qt
Qt
 
_LNt
LNt
= (1  ) (  1)'Nt   gL. (47)
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In the steady state, xNt is stationary implying that the steady-state arrival rate of innovation
is
'N =
gL
(1  ) (  1) , (48)
which is determined by exogenous parameters in this semi-endogenous growth model. As
discussed in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), the law of motion in (47) implies that any
increase (decrease) in the steady-state level of xN must be associated with a temporary
increase (decrease) in 'Nt during the transition path. Therefore, if a parameter increases
(decreases) xN in the long run, it must have increased (decreased) 'Nt in the short run.
Using (24) and (25), one can show that the balanced-growth values of assets are
vNt (j) =
Nt (j)
+ 'N
, (49)
vFt (j) =
Ft (j)
+ 'N + 
. (50)
Substituting (17), (19) and (49) into (20) yields the following steady-state innovative R&D
condition:
(   1)(+ 'N)(1 + N iN)
1  N =
~LNy;t
Q1 t
=
1
(1  s)xN
~LNy;t
Lt
, (51)
where the second equality is obtained by multiplying ~LNy;t=Q
1 
t by 1 = (Lt=Lt)(L
N
t =L
N
t ).
Similarly, substituting (18), (19), (20), (21) and (50) into (22) yields the following steady-
state adaptive R&D condition:
(   1)(+ 'N + )
" 
1 + SiS


1  F +
 
1 + N iN

!
1  N
#
=
~LFy;t
Q1 t
=
1
(1  s)xN
~LFy;t
Lt
, (52)
where !  wNt =wSt is the relative wage between the two countries. Using (13) and (14), we
derive
~LFy;t
Lt
=  1!
~LNy;t
Lt
. (53)
Substituting (51) and (52) into (53) yields the following steady-state relative-wage condition:
+ 'N
+ 'N + 
(!)   ! = 

1  N
1  F

(1 + SiS)
(1 + N iN)
, (54)
which is an implicit function determining the steady-state equilibrium value of the relative
wage !(iN ; iS). It can be shown using (54) that !(iN ; iS) is decreasing in iN and increasing
in iS. Given  > 1, it is easy to show that ! > 1. Then, to ensure that z > !,31 we impose
the following parameter restriction:
+ 'N
+ 'N + 
z   z > 

1  N
1  F

(1 + SiS)
(1 + N iN)
. (P1)
31z > ! is equivalent to wS= > wN=z.
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Substituting (51) into (40) to eliminate ~LNy;t=Lt yields the Northern steady-state condition
given by
1 = xN

(   1)(+ 'N)
1  N
'N
'N + 'F
(1 + N iN) + 'N

. (55)
The Northern steady-state condition contains two endogenous variables fxN ; 'Fg32 and is
positively sloped in the (xN ; 'F ) space with a positive xN -intercept. The intuition for the
positive relationship between xN and 'F in the Northern steady-state condition can be
explained as follows. A larger 'F leads to more products being manufactured in the South
and less products being manufactured in the North, which in turn leads to a reallocation of
labor in the North from production to innovative R&D due to the resource constraint on
Northern labor. Then, increasing northern R&D labor raises xN in the steady state.
Substituting (52) into (45) to eliminate ~LFy;t=Lt yields the Southern steady-state condition
given by
1 =
xN'F (1  s)=s
'N + 'F

(   1)(+ 'N + )

(1 + SiS)
1  F +
(1 + N iN)
1  N !(i
N
 
; iS
+
)

() + 'N

.
(56)
The Southern steady-state condition also contains two endogenous variables fxN ; 'Fg33 and
is negative sloped in the (xN ; 'F ) space with no intercepts. The intuition for the negative
relationship between xN and 'F in the Southern steady-state condition can be explained
as follows. A larger 'F leads to more products being manufactured in the South, which in
turn leads to a reallocation of labor in the South from adaptive R&D to production due to
the resource constraint on Southern labor. As (44) shows, a larger 'F would be consistent
with a lower amount of adaptive R&D labor if the di¢ culty level xN = Q1 =LN decreases
su¢ ciently (i.e., technologies become su¢ ciently easier to be transferred to the South).
Finally, (55) and (56) are the two conditions that implicitly solve for the steady-state
equilibrium values of fxN ; 'Fg.34 Graphically, xN and 'F are determined by the intersection
of the North curve and the South curve in Figure 1.
32Recall that 'N = gL= [(1  ) (  1)] and iN = N + + gL= [(1  ) (   1)] are determined by exoge-
nous parameters in the steady state.
33Recall that !(iN ; iS) in (54) and iS = S +  + gL= [(1  ) (   1)] are also determined by exogenous
parameters in the steady state.
34These conditions are the same as the ones in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) when  = 1 and
 = N = S = N = S = iN = iS = 0.
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Figure 1: The steady-state equilibrium
3.5 Social welfare
In this section, we derive the steady-state level of social welfare in each country, which we
will use to simulate the welfare e¤ects of the CIA constraints in the quantitative analysis.
Imposing balanced growth on (1) yields the steady-state welfare of the Northern household
given by
UN =
1
  gL

ln cN0 +
gc
  gL

, (57)
where gc = gL= [(1  ) (   1)] is determined by exogenous parameters due to semi-endogenous
growth. Therefore, the steady-state welfare is determined by the balanced-growth level of
consumption. Substituting the lump-sum transfer Nt from the government into (2) yields
cNt = (rt   _aNt =aNt   gL)aNt + iNt bNt + wNt + dNt .
Therefore, the balanced-growth level of consumption cN0 is given by the sum of (a) asset
income (   gL)aN0 , (b) interest income iNbN0 ,35 (c) wage income wN0 , and (d) R&D prot
income dN0 . An analogous derivation applies to the steady-state welfare of the Southern
household. To determine aN0 and a
S
0 , we need to impose an assumption on the distribution
of assets. Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), we assume that the asset from
innovative R&D in the North is owned by the Northern household whereas the asset from
adaptive R&D in the South is owned by the Southern household. Under this assumption,
we show in Lemma 2 that the balanced-growth levels of consumption can be expressed as
cN0 = w
N
0 I
N and cS0 = w
S
0 I
S, where fIN ; ISg denote income as a ratio of real wages because
the di¤erent types of income are proportional to fwN0 ; wS0 g.
35Interest income iNbN appears in the budget of the household because together with R&D labor income
(captured by wage income wN ), it represents the factor income from R&D that is paid to the household.
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Lemma 2 The balanced-growth level of consumption can be expressed as
cN0 = w
N
0 I
N = (	Q0)
1
 1 IN = [	(LN0 x
N)
1
1  ]
1
 1 IN , (58)
cS0 = w
S
0 I
S =
(	Q0)
1
 1
!
IS =
[	(LN0 x
N)
1
1  ]
1
 1
!
IS, (59)
where LN0 is exogenous and f	; IN ; ISg are given by
	 =
'N
'N + 'F

   1

 1
| {z }
Northern leaders
+
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F

   1

 1
(!) 1| {z }
Southern a¢ liates
+

'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
(!) 1| {z }
Southern competitive rms
,
IN =
(  gL)
 
1 + N iN

xN
1  N

'N
'N + 'F
+
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F

| {z }
asset income
+ iNN'NxN| {z }
interest income
+ 1|{z}
wage income
+
N'N
 
1 + N iN

xN
1  N| {z }
R&D prot income
,
IS =
(  gL)(1 + SiS)xN
1  F

'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F

1  s
s| {z }
asset income
+ iSS'FxN
'N
'N + 'F
1  s
s| {z }
interest income
+ 1|{z}
wage income
+
F'F
 
1 + SiS

xN
1  F

'N
'N + 'F
1  s
s

| {z }
R&D prot income
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition of the above expressions can be explained as follows. Recall that real wages
are given by wN0 = [	(L
N
0 x
N)
1
1  ]
1
 1 and wS0 = [	(L
N
0 x
N)
1
1  ]
1
 1=!; therefore, the term 	
captures the quality contributions of Northern leaders, Southern a¢ liates, and Southern
competitive rms to consumption through the real wage. As for the terms IN and IS, they
represent the contributions of the di¤erent sources of income to consumption.
4 Ination and the CIA constraints
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of ination via the CIA constraints. A higher ination
rate S in the South increases the Southern nominal interest rate iS and a¤ects only the
Southern steady-state condition in (56). Specically, it shifts the South curve to the left in
Figure 1. As a result, both 'F and xN decrease along with an increase in ! as implied by (54).
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Intuitively, a higher nominal interest rate iS in the South raises the cost of adaptive R&D
and reduces the rate of international technology transfer 'F . The decrease in the number
of products manufactured by Southern a¢ liates implies more products being produced by
Northern rms. The higher demand for production labor causes a reallocation of labor in
the North from R&D to production. The decrease in innovative R&D in the North decreases
the rate of innovation in the short run and leads to a lower average quality per worker xN
in the long run. Finally, given that the increase in S and iS has a direct negative e¤ect on
the demand for Southern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the South relative to the
North. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 A higher ination rate in the South leads to (a) a permanent decrease in
the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South, (b) a permanent increase in the
North-South wage gap, and (c) a temporary decrease in the rate of innovation in the North.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A higher ination rate N in the North increases the Northern nominal interest rate
iN and a¤ects both the Northern and Southern steady-state conditions in (55) and (56).
Specically, it shifts both the South curve and the North curve to the left in Figure 1. As a
result, the e¤ect on 'F is ambiguous, and xN decreases along with a decrease in ! as implied
by (54). Intuitively, an increase in the nominal interest rate iN in the North raises the cost
of innovative R&D. As a result, the rate of innovation decreases in the short run, and the
average quality per worker xN decreases in the long run. Given that the increase in N and
iN has a direct negative e¤ect on the demand for Northern R&D labor, it depresses the wage
rate in the North relative to the South.
As for the e¤ect of N and iN on the rate of international technology transfer 'F , there
are two opposing e¤ects. To see this, we use 'Ft (j) = '
F
t and (44) to derive
'Ft =
Qt
QNt
LFr;t =
1
xNt
LFr;t
(1  s)Lt
Qt
QNt
, (60)
where the second equality uses xNt = Q
1 
t =L
N
t and L
N
t = (1   s)Lt. In the steady state,
QNt =Qt is given by (34), and hence, (60) can be reexpressed as
'N'F
'N + 'F
=
1
xN
LFr;t
(1  s)Lt , (61)
where the left-hand side is monotonically increasing in 'F . From (61), we see that the
Northern nominal interest rate iN a¤ects 'F via the quality level per worker xN and the
number of adaptive R&D workers LFr;t. On the one hand, an increase in i
N reduces xN and
has a positive e¤ect on 'F by decreasing the di¢ culty of adaptive R&D. On the other hand,
the increase in iN also reduces the incentives for adaptive R&D by changing the asset values.
To see this, we combine (49) and (50) to derive
vFt (j)
vNt (j)
=
+ 'N
+ 'N + 
Ft (j)
Nt (j)
=
+ 'N
+ 'N + 


wNt
wSt
 1
, (62)
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where the second equality uses (17)-(18) and then (13)-(14). Recall that the increase in iN
reduces the relative wage ! = wNt =w
S
t ; therefore, it also reduces v
F
t (j)=v
N
t (j). In other words,
the decrease in the North-South wage gap makes adaptive R&D less attractive relative to
innovative R&D. This leads to a decrease in adaptive R&D in the South, which in turn has a
negative e¤ect on the rate of international technology transfer 'F . This negative e¤ect of iN
via the number of adaptive R&D workers in the South is relatively strong when the Southern
population size s is large. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of N and iN on 'F would be negative
if s is su¢ ciently large, and vice versa. We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 A higher ination rate in the North leads to (a) a temporary decrease in
the rate of innovation in the North, (b) a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap,
and (c) a permanent decrease (increase) in the rate of technology transfer to the South if
Southern population size is su¢ ciently large (small).
Proof. See Appendix A.
5 Quantitative analysis for China and the US
In this section, we provide a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of ination via the CIA
constraints. Specically, we explore their welfare implications. Therefore, the purpose of
this section is to provide an illustrative numerical experiment to quantify the welfare e¤ects
of ination via the CIA constraints. For the parameter values, we set them to conventional
values in the literature or calibrate them using empirical moments. For parameters that are
di¢ cult to pin down, we will consider robustness checks. We consider China as the South
and the US as the North.
In the qualitative analysis in the previous section, we obtain the pattern of production
shifting back to the North upon the arrival of new innovations by imposing z > ! using the
parameter restriction in (P1). The condition z > ! allows the model to deliver a realistic
pattern of o¤shoring and reshoring between the US and China.36 For the quality step size
z, we consider a conventional value of 1.2. For !, we consider recent data from the Federal
Reserve Economic Data on relative income between the US and China, and this value is
5.493 between 2010 and 2015. Then, we choose a value of  = 0:2 such that the condition
z > ! holds.
For the discount rate , we follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set it to 0.05. As in
Jones andWilliams (2000), we set the population growth rate gL to 1.44%, which corresponds
to the long-run growth rate of the US labor force. In the model, it is = (rather than the
individual values of  and ) that determines the values of variables in equilibrium.37 We
calibrate = by matching the relative wage ! from the model to the data discussed above.
36For example, in a survey, the Boston Consulting Group (2011) document that "[t]ransportation goods
such as vehicles and auto parts, electrical equipment including household appliances, and furniture are among
seven sectors that could create 2 to 3 million jobs as a result of manufacturing returning to the U.S."
37xN is the only variable a¤ected by , but the equilibrium value of xN is independent of . Given that
it is the value of xN that matters, we simply normalize  to one when reporting the value of xN .
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For other parameters, we calibrate them to US data from 1995 to 2015. For the substitution
elasticity , we calibrate it by using the US per capita consumption growth rate gc of 1.82%
according to the Federal Reserve Economic Data. For the relative Southern population
size s, we set it to 0.833 based on data from the World Development Indicators on the
labor force size of China and the US. We calibrate the values of the intratemporal R&D
externality parameters fS; Ng by using the R&D shares of GDP in China and in the US.
According to the OECD Research and Development Statistics, the average R&D shares of
GDP are respectively 0.013 in China and 0.026 in the US. We calibrate iS and iN using
average ination rates in China and the US, and S is 2.94% and N is 2.27% according to
the Federal Reserve Economic Data. For the CIA parameters, we set S = 0:5 and N = 0:5
in the benchmark and explore other values in Section 5.3. For the imitation rate , we set
it to a value of 0.03 and explore other values in Section 5.2. For the intertemporal R&D
externality parameter , we calibrate it by using a benchmark innovation arrival rate 'N of
0.06 and exploring other values in Section 5.1.
For external validity, the calibrated value of  = 6:195 is roughly in line with the mean
estimate of substitution elasticity at the three-digit level in Broda and Weinstein (2006).
Furthermore, under the calibrated parameter values, the equilibrium value of r is 0.068,
which is roughly in line with the real rate of return in the US stock market. Finally, the
equilibrium values of fxN ; 'Fg are respectively 0.514 and 0.066, and a summary of the
calibrated parameter values is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
 z  =  iS iN gL s  
F N  S N
0.05 1.2 0.03 3.041 6.195 0.098 0.091 0.014 0.833 0.848 0.560 0.778 0.2 0.5 0.5
Given these calibrated parameter values, we consider the following experiments: (a)
decreasing ination in the US to achieve a zero nominal interest rate (i.e., iN = 0), and
(b) decreasing ination in China to achieve a zero nominal interest rate (i.e., iS = 0). The
results are reported in Table 2. We nd that a permanent decrease in ination in the US
would raise the wage gap ! by 0.18% (percent change) and decrease international technology
transfer 'F by 1.06% (percent change). Here 'F decreases despite an increase in adaptive
R&D because of the increase in the quality index xN , which makes technology transfer more
di¢ cult. The e¤ect of xN on 'F dominates because s is not su¢ ciently large despite the
rather large population in China. The decrease in iN leads to a welfare gain of 4.93% in the
US and a welfare gain of 5.02% in China.38 From Section 3.5, we see that the percent change
in cN0 is equal to the percent change in w
N
0 plus the percent change in I
N . Table 2 shows
that when iN decreases, wN0 increases by 5.12% whereas c
N
0 increases by 4.93%, implying
that IN decreases slightly by 0.19%. Therefore, the quantitatively signicant welfare gain
as a result of the decrease in iN is mostly due to the large increase in wage, which in turn is
due to the large increase in the level of technology xN by 4.09% (percent change).
A permanent decrease in ination in China would reduce the wage gap ! by 0.20% and
increase technology transfer 'F by 1.21%. Also, it leads to a welfare gain of 0.41% in China
and a welfare gain of 0.43% in the US. In this case, the welfare gains in the two countries
38Welfare changes are all expressed in the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
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are relatively small because the increase in wage is small, which in turn is due to the small
increase in the level of technology xN by 0.39%. In other words, although decreasing ination
in either China or the US leads to an increase in innovation and the technology level, ination
in the US has much larger e¤ects on innovation and global welfare.
Table 2: Simulation
iN ! xN 'F  lnwN0  lnw
S
0  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0
0.091 5.493 0.514 0.0663 - - - -
0 5.503 0.535 0.0656 5.116% 4.933% 4.929% 5.020%
iS ! xN 'F  lnwN0  lnw
S
0  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0
0.098 5.493 0.514 0.0663 - - - -
0 5.482 0.516 0.0671 0.380% 0.569% 0.433% 0.409%
5.1 Robustness check on the innovation-arrival rate
Starting from this subsection, we perform a number of robustness checks. In our benchmark
calibration, we assume 'N = 0:06. In this subsection, we consider two alternative values of
'N 2 f0:04; 0:08g and recalibrate the intertemporal externality parameter  while holding
other parameter values constant. Table 3 reports the new simulation results. In Table
3, we see that the welfare e¤ects of ination depend on the value of the intertemporal
externality, which reects the specied value of the innovation-arrival rate. We nd that
a higher intertemporal externality tends to magnify the welfare e¤ects of ination. For
example, in the case of 'N = 0:08, the welfare gains of decreasing US ination become
6.53% in the US and 6.66% in China. However, the overall pattern of the cross-country
e¤ects of ination remains the same as before. In other words, ination in the US has much
larger e¤ects on global welfare than ination in China.
Table 3: Simulation under 'N 2 f0:04; 0:08g
 lnwN0  lnw
S
0  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0
'N= 0:04 ( = 0:77)
iN 3.469% 3.287% 3.319% 3.356%
iS 0.215% 0.403% 0.259% 0.283%
'N= 0:08 ( = 0:89)
iN 6.741% 6.558% 6.527% 6.658%
iS 0.556% 0.746% 0.616% 0.557%
5.2 Robustness check on the imitation rate
In this subsection, we perform another robustness check by considering other values for the
imitation rate  2 f0:07; 0:11g, while holding other parameter values constant. Table 4
reports the new simulation results. In Table 4, we see that a higher imitation rate tends
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to slightly enlarge the welfare e¤ects of US ination. For example, in the case of  = 0:11,
the welfare gains of decreasing US ination become 5.18% in the US and 5.18% in China.
Interestingly, a higher imitation rate slightly reduces the welfare e¤ects of Chinas ination.
For example, in the case of  = 0:11, the welfare gains of decreasing Chinas ination become
0.21% in the US and 0.30% in China. Nevertheless, the pattern that ination in the US has
much larger e¤ects on global welfare than ination in China still holds.
Table 4: Simulation under  2 f0:07; 0:11g
 lnwN0  lnw
S
0  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0
 =0:07
iN 5.245% 5.069% 5.094% 5.121%
iS 0.261% 0.443% 0.291% 0.346%
 =0:11
iN 5.314% 5.143% 5.180% 5.179%
iS 0.194% 0.372% 0.214% 0.304%
5.3 Robustness check on the CIA parameters
In this subsection, we consider alternative values for the CIA parameters while holding other
parameter values constant. Table 5 reports the new simulation results. We nd that a
larger N magnies the welfare e¤ects of US ination. For example, in the case of N = 1,
the welfare gains of decreasing US ination become 9.67% in the US and 9.84% in China.
Interestingly, a larger N slightly reduces the welfare e¤ects of Chinas ination. For example,
in the case of N = 1, the welfare gains of decreasing Chinas ination become 0.42% in the
US and 0.40% in China. Similarly, we nd that a larger S magnies the welfare e¤ects of
Chinas ination and slightly reduces the welfare e¤ects of US ination. Nevertheless, the
pattern that ination in the US has much larger e¤ects on global welfare than ination in
China still holds.
Table 5: Simulation under N = 1 or S = 1
 lnwN0  lnw
S
0  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0
N ; S
	
= f1; 0:5g
iN 10.027% 9.675% 9.666% 9.843%
iS 0.371% 0.555% 0.424% 0.399%
N ; S
	
= f0:5; 1g
iN 5.107% 4.919% 4.919% 5.009%
iS 0.752% 1.128% 0.857% 0.812%
6 Alternative R&D specication
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results under an alternative R&D speci-
cation that yields fully endogenous growth in the long run.39 The main di¤erence in this
39See Cozzi (2017a,b) for a hybrid approach that combines semi-endogenous growth and fully endogenous
growth in a unied framework.
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version of the model is in the instantaneous probability of innovative and adaptive R&D.
Specically, if an R&D entrepreneur employs Northern labor LNr;t (j) to engage in innovative
R&D in industry j, then she is successful in inventing the next higher-quality product in the
industry with an instantaneous probability given by
'Nt (j) =

LNr;t
N 
LNr;t (j)
1 N
LNt
. (63)
If the Southern a¢ liate of a Northern leader in industry j employs Southern labor LFr;t (j)
to engage in adaptive R&D, then the Northern rm is successful in shifting the production
to the Southern a¢ liate with an instantaneous probability given by
'Ft (j) =

LFr;t
F 
LFr;t (j)
1 F
LSt
. (64)
By analogous derivations (available upon request) as in Section 3, the steady-state
relative-wage condition can be expressed as follows:
+ 'N   gL
+ 'N +   gL (!)
   ! = 

1  N
1  F

s
1  s

(1 + SiS)
(1 + N iN)
, (65)
which is an implicit function that determines the steady-state equilibrium value of the relative
wage !('N ; iN ; iS). It can be shown using (65) that !('N ; iN ; iS) is decreasing in 'N and
iN whereas it is increasing in iS. Similarly, we also derive the steady-state Northern labor-
market condition given by
1 = 

(   1) (+ 'N   gL)
1  N
'N
'N + 'F
(1 + N iN) + 'N

(66)
and the steady-state Southern labor-market condition given by
1 =
(   1)'F
'N + 'F

'N + (= (   1)) 
'N + 

(+ 'N +   gL) (67)

" 
1 + SiS


1  F +
 
1 + N iN


1  N

1  s
s

!('N ; iN ; iS)
#
+ 'F .
Equations (66) and (67) are the two conditions that implicitly solve for the steady-state
equilibrium values of

'N ; 'F
	
.
Next, we derive the growth rate of consumption. Equation (13) shows that labor demand
for an average-quality product produced by a Northern leader is ~LNy;t = QtCt

wNt = (   1)
 
.
Equation (46) implies that the growth rate of the quality index is _Qt=Qt = (  1)'Nt . It can
be shown that _Ct=Ct = _cNt =c
N
t + gL by using (5) and _w
N
t =w
N
t = gc by using (2). Combining
these conditions yields
gc =

  1
   1

'N , (68)
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where the Northern innovation-arrival rate 'N is implicitly determined by (65)-(67). As for
social welfare, the steady-state welfare function of the Northern household is the same as
(57). The balanced-growth level of consumption can be revised as follows:
cN0 = w
N
0 H
N = (	Q0)
1
 1 HN , (69)
cS0 = w
S
0H
S =
(	Q0)
1
 1
!
HS, (70)
where initial Q0 is normalized to unity and

HN , HS
	
are given by
HN =
(  gL)
 
1 + N iN


1  N + i
NN'N + 1 +
N'N
 
1 + N iN


1  N ,
HS =
(  gL)(1 + SiS)
1  F + i
SS'F + 1 +
F'F
 
1 + SiS


1  F .
Given the complexity of this alternative model, we resort to numerical analysis in the rest
of this section. We begin by considering the same benchmark parameter values as before;
i.e.,

; z; gL; s; 
F ; N ; ; S; N
	
= f0:05; 1:2; 0:014; 0:83; 0:56; 0:78; 0:2; 0:5; 0:5g. Then, for
the remaining parameters f; ; ; ; iS; iNg, we calibrate them to data from 1995 to 2015
as before using the same set of moments; i.e., the growth rate of per capita consumption
in the US, the relative wage between China and the US, the R&D shares of GDP and the
ination rates in the two countries.40 We report the parameter values in Table 6. Given
these parameter values, the equilibrium values of f'N ; 'Fg are respectively 0.058 and 0.065.
Table 6: Calibrated parameter values
 z     iS iN gL s 
F N  S N
0.05 1.2 0.033 0.559 0.292 6.527 0.098 0.091 0.014 0.833 0.560 0.778 0.2 0.5 0.5
Given these calibrated parameter values, we consider the same experiments as before:
(a) decreasing ination in the US to achieve a zero nominal interest rate (i.e., iN = 0), and
(b) decreasing ination in China to achieve a zero nominal interest rate (i.e., iS = 0). The
results are reported in Table 7. We nd that a permanent decrease in ination in the US
decreases the wage gap ! by 0.07% (percent change) and raises the innovation arrival rate 'N
by 7.94% (percent change), international technology transfer 'F by 9.23% (percent change)
and the growth rate of consumption gc by 0.14% (percentage point). The decrease in iN leads
to a welfare gain (in terms of equivalent variation in consumption) of 3.90% in the US and a
welfare gain of 4.38% in China. Therefore, when iN decreases, the fully endogenous growth
model exhibits slightly smaller welfare gains than the semi-endogenous growth model.
A permanent decrease in ination in China reduces the wage gap ! by 0.18% and in-
creases the innovation arrival rate 'N by 0.52%, technology transfer 'F by 1.54% and the
consumption growth rate gc by 0.01%. Also it leads to a welfare gain of 0.14% in China and
a welfare gain of 0.29% in the US. In this case, the welfare gains are also slightly smaller in
40It is useful to note that in the fully endogenous growth model, we need the separate values of  and .
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the fully endogenous growth model than in the semi-endogenous growth model. However,
the pattern that ination in the US has much larger e¤ects on global welfare than ination
in China continues to hold in the fully endogenous growth model.
Table 7: Simulation
iN ! 'N 'F gc  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0 U
N US
0.091 5.493 0.0579 0.065 - - - - -
0 5.489 0.0625 0.071 0.144% -0.216% 0.242% 3.902% 4.379%
iS ! 'N 'F gc  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0 U
N US
0.098 5.493 0.0579 0.065 - - - - -
0 5.483 0.0582 0.066 0.010% 0.005% -0.145% 0.287% 0.137%
7 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the e¤ects of ination via CIA constraints on R&D in a
Schumpeterian economy with North-South product cycles. We show that ination a¤ects
innovation, technology transfer and the allocation of manufacturing activities across coun-
tries. Calibrating the model to China-US data, we nd that the cross-country welfare e¤ect
of ination is quantitatively signicant from the North to the South, but less so from the
South to the North. The reason is that innovation originates from the North in the model,
which until recently is a reasonable approximation to reality as OECD countries perform
the majority of global R&D. However, as China and other developing countries become
more innovative, the e¤ect of Southern ination on global welfare is likely to become more
signicant.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), the dynamics of the quality
indices is given by
_QNt =
Z
Nt
h
nt(j)+1   nt(j)
i
'Nt dj +
Z
Ft +
S
t
nt(j)+1'Nt dj  
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t
  'Ft QNt ,
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Lets dene QFSt  QFt + QSt , which implies _QFSt = 'Ft QNt   'Nt QFSt . Setting _QNt =QNt =
_QFSt =Q
FS
t yields (34), using Q
FS
t = Qt   QNt . Setting _QFt =QFt = _QSt =QSt yields QSt =Qt = 
QFt =Qt
 
=
 
'Nt

, noting QFSt =Q
N
t =
 
1 QNt =Qt

=(QNt =Qt) = '
F
t =
 
'Nt

: Applying
this to QFt =Qt +Q
S
t =Qt = 1 QNt =Qt and using (34), equations (35) and (36) follow.
Proof of Lemma 2. Time arguments are omitted for convenience. Using N = ( _MN +
gLM
N)=PN and _MN=MN = N + _mN=mN , we derive N =
 
N + gL

mN + _mN . Substi-
tuting this condition into the balanced-growth version of (2) yields
cN = (  gL) aN + iNNwN'NxN + wN +
NwN'N
 
1 + N iN

xN
1  N , (A1)
where we have used rN =  + gc, _aN=aN = gc, mN = bN =
R 1
0
NwNLNr (j)dj=L
N =
NwN'NxN , and dN =
R 1
0
N'NvN (j) dj=LN = NwN'N
 
1 + N iN

xN=
 
1  N. Fol-
lowing Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), we assume that the Northern household nances
innovative R&D in equilibrium. That is, LNaN =
R
N+F
vN(j)dj. Given that vN(j) = 
1 + N iN

wNLNr (j)=
 
1  N'N from (20), we have
aN =
 
1 + N iN

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
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which uses (19), (39) and Lemma 1. Using (A1) and (A2), we can show that cN = wNIN ,
where IN is dened in Lemma 2. By incorporating (8), (10) and (12) into the aggregate price
index
R
[pt(j)]
1  dj
	1=(1 )
= 1, we can use Lemma 1 to derive (58) by showing that the real
wage in the North is wN = (	Q)1=(1 ), where Q = (LNxN)1=(1 ) and 	 is dened in Lemma
2. Applying analogous derivations to the Southern asset condition, one can also derive (59)
by noting that mS = bS =
R
N
SwSLFr (j)dj=L
S, dF =
R
N
F'F [vF (j)   vN (j)]dj=LS, and
LSaS =
R
F

vF (j)  vN(j) dj, which comes from the assumption that the Southern house-
hold nances adaptive R&D and that vF (j)   vN(j) =  1 + SiSwSLFr (j)=  1  F 'F 
from (22).
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Proof of Proposition 1. It is easy to graphically show from (54) that ! increases
with iS, proving (b). Given this, an increase in iS leads to a downward shift in the South
curve (56), whereas it has no e¤ect on the North curve (55). Applying a simple graphical
analysis to Figure 1, we nd that an increase in iS leads to permanent decreases in 'F and
xN . This proves (a) and also (c) because a permanent decrease in xN must be associated
with a temporary decrease in the innovation rate 'Nt below its steady-state level '
N =
gL= [(1  ) (  1)] given the dynamics in (47).
Proof of Proposition 2. Graphical analysis with (54) implies that ! decreases with
iN , proving (b). An increase in iN leads to a downward shift in both the North and South
curves, (55) and (56), given that we can easily show from (54) that
 
1 + N iN

! increases
with iN . Thus, an increase in iN leads to a decrease in xN , implying a temporary decrease
in the innovation rate 'Nt given the dynamics in (47) and proving (a). As for (c), we solve
(55) and (56) for 'F to obtain41
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s
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
 . (A3)
Di¤erentiating (A3) with respect to iN , we nd that d'F=diN > (<) 0 holds if the following
inequality holds:42
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Given that the right-hand side of (A4) is monotonically increasing in s, d'F=diN > (<) 0
becomes more likely to hold as s decreases (increases). Given that s has an upper bound
~s,43 which ensures 'F > 0, we can show that the inequality < in (A4) must hold as s ! ~s
41Here we have used the following condition derived from (54):
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implying that d'F=diN < 0 for a su¢ ciently large s. As s! 0, the right-hand side of (A4)
becomes negative. Therefore, d'F=diN > 0 holds if the left-hand side of (A4) is positive,
which is guaranteed by = > z'N=(+ 'N) given that z > !.
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